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The following paper was presented in part during the 1 s t International 
Influenza Symposium organized in Athens, on February 23 r c* 2007, 
in the amphitheatre of the Foundation of Biomedical Research of the 
Academy of Athens (FBRAA), under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Rural Deve lopment and Food, the FBRAA and the Hel lenic 
Veterinary Medical Society. 
Η εργασία αυτή ανακοινώθηκε στο 1° Διεθνές Συμπόσιο για τη 
Γρίπη που διοργανώθηκε στις 23 Φεβρουαρίου 2007 στο αμφιθέ­
ατρο του Ιδρύματος Ιατροβιολογικών Ερευνών της Ακαδημίας Αθη­
ν ώ ν από την Ελληνική Κτηνιατρική Εταιρεία, σε συνεργασία με το 
Ί δ ρ υ μ α Ιατροβιολογικών Ερευνών της Ακαδημίας Αθηνών και υπό 
την αιγίδα του Υπουργείου Αγροτικής Ανάπτυξης και Τροφίμων. 
Τρόφιμα ως πιθανή πηγή μόλυνσης 
των θηλαστικών με τσν ιό γρίπης 
Η5Ν1 
Food as a passible source af H5N1 
influenza virus infection in 
mammals 
Pensaert M., Kyriakis C.S., Van Reeth K. Pensaert M., Kyriakis C.S., Van Reeth K. 
Π Ε Ρ Ι Λ Η Ψ Η . Τ α πρόσφατα κρούσματα γρίπης ανθρώπων και 
άλλων θηλαστικών από τον υψηλής λοιμογόνου ικανότητας ιό της 
γρίπης των πτηνών Η 5 Ν 1 έχουν προκαλέσει ερωτήματα σχετικά 
με την ασφάλεια της κατανάλωσης των πτηνοτροφικών προϊό­
ντων. Ο σκοπός αυτής της ανασκόπησης είναι η συλλογή και πα­
ρουσίαση πληροφοριών αναφορικά με τον κίνδυνο της προσβολής 
των ανθρώπων από τον ιό Η5Ν1 μέσω της στοματικής οδού. Η πα­
ρουσία του ίου στα εδώδιμα πτηνοτροφικά προϊόντα και οι αλλα­
γές εισόδου του ίου μέσω του γαστροεντερικου σωλήνα (Gl), κα­
θώς και οι πιθανότητες της εισαγωγής του μέσω του γαστροεντε­
ρικου σωλήνα (Gl), από απόψεως λοιμογόνου ικανότητας, είναι τα 
κυρία σημεία εστίασης. Η μετάδοση του Η 5 Ν 1 από τα πτηνά στον 
άνθρωπο είναι σπάνια και έχει συνδυαστεί με την πολύ στενή επα­
φ ή του ανθρώπου με τα ασθενή ζώα. Είναι γενικά αποδεκτό ότι οι 
πλέον πιθανοί οδοί εισόδου του ίου είναι η στοματοφαρυγγική 
και/ή οι ιστοί του αναπνευστικού σωλήνα όπου μπορεί να συμβεί 
η αντιτυπωση του ίου και να οδηγήσει σε κλινικά συμπτώματα. 
Όμως, ο μικρός αριθμός περιστατικών σε ανθρώπους σε σύγκρι­
ση με το μεγάλο αριθμό των ανθρώπων που έχουν έρθει σε επα­
φ ή με ασθενή από τον ιό Η 5 Ν 1 ζώα, αποδεικνύει καθαρά ότι δεν 
υφίσταται εύκολα αποδεκτή θύρα εισόδου. Η πιθανότητα εισόδου 
του ίου μέσω του Gl σωλήνα έχει προταθεί, αλλά μέχρι τώρα δεν 
έχει αποδειχθεί ότι ο ιός μπορεί να αντιτυπωθεί στο έντερο του αν­
θρώπου. Η ύπαρξη διάρροιας σε μερικούς ασθενείς και η εύρεση 
του ίίκου RNA σε ληφθέν υλικό (swabs) από το έντερο και το ορ­
θό τριών ασθενών δεν επιτρέπει να εξαχθεί, με ασφάλεια, συμπέ­
ρασμα ότι ο Gl σωλήνας μπορεί χρησιμεύει ως θύρα εισόδου ή όρ­
γανο στόχου. Περαιτέρω, τα περιστατικά της νόσου σε ανθρώ­
πους δεν έχουν καθαρά ή οριστικά συνδεθεί με την κατανάλωση 
κρέατος πτηνών. Είδη αιλουροειδών, αφετέρου, έχουν φυσικά 
και πειραματικά μολυνθεί μετά την κατανάλωση προσβεβλημένων 
πτηνών. Όμως, επίσης και σε αυτά τα θηλαστικά, δεν επιβεβαιώ-
A B S T R A C T . T h e recent infections of humans and other 
mammals with die highly padiogenic H 5 N 1 avian influenza virus 
have raised questions about the safety of the consumption of poultry 
products. T h e aim of this review is to collect and present 
information regarding the risk of infection in humans with H 5 N 1 
virus via the oral route. The presence of virus in edible poultry 
products and the chances for viral entry via the gastrointestinal 
(GI) tract, from a pathogenetic point of view, are the main focus 
points. The transmission of H5N1 from poultry to humans is a rare 
event which has been associated with very close contact with infected 
animals. It is generally accepted that the most likely candidate 
routes for the virus entry are the oropharygeal and/or respiratory 
tract tissues where virus replication may occur and leading to clinical 
symptoms. However, the low number of human cases, compared 
to the high number of humans that have been exposed to H 5 N 1 
virus infected animals, shows clearly that a readily accessible portal 
of entry does not exist. The possibility of virus entry through the 
GI tract has been proposed, but, so far, no proof that the virus can 
replicate in the human intestines has been shown. The presence of 
diarrhoea in several patients and the detection of viral RNA in the 
intestines and rectal swabs of 3 patients do not allow one to safely 
conclude that the GI tract can serve as a portal of entry or a target 
organ. Furthermore, the occurrence of disease has not clearly or 
definitely been associated with the consumption of poultry meat in 
any human case. Feline species, on the other hand, have been 
naturally and experimentally infected after the consumption of 
infected poultry. However, also in these mammals, it was not 
established that the intestine is the initial portal of entry of the virus. 
In conclusion, the possibility that the intestinal tract serves as a 
portal of entry in mammals remains unlikely, since there is no 
convincing evidence that the GI tract tissues can support virus 
replication. It can, however, not be excluded that food containing 
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θηκε όχι χο έντερο ήχαν η αρχική θύρα εισόδου χου ίου. Συμπε­
ρασματικά, η πιθανόχηχα ο εντερικός σωλήνας να χρησιμεύει σχα 
θηλασχικά ως θύρα εισόδου παραμένει απίθανο, μιας και δεν 
υπάρχει καμία πειστική απόδειξη όχι οι ισχοί χου Gl σωλήνα μπο­
ρεί να υποστηρίζουν χην ανχιχυπωση χου ίου. Όμως, δεν μπορεί 
να αποκλειστεί όχι χρόφιμα χα οποία περιέχουν χον ιό μπορεί να 
αποχελέσουν πηγή μόλυνσης όχαν περνούν χους οτομαχο-φαρυγ-
γικους ισχους, οι οποίοι έχουν χαυχοποιηθεί ως σημεία-σχόχοι για 
χην ανχιχυπωση χου ίου. 
Λέξεις ευρετηρίασης: τρόφιμα, γρίπη πτηνών, θηλαστικά 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The recent Η5Ν1 avian influenza epidemic in 
poultry in several Asian countries has led to the 
occurrence of direct bird to human transmissions of the 
virus. This unexpected and unprecedented evolution 
has given rise to an increasing global concern about the 
zoonotic character and the pandemic potential of the 
highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses. 
Since the H5N1 virus has not adapted to humans so 
far and considering the low number of human cases 
compared to the high number of contacts, the trans­
mission of the virus to humans cannot be considered as 
zoonotic events, but rather as occasional zoonotic 
incidents. Although occurring rarely, transmission of 
avian influenza viruses is certainly a concern for public 
health and better insights in the factors and mechanisms 
allowing the infection in humans to start are needed 
when trying to avoid such incidents. 
The pathogenesis of H5N1 infections in humans is 
poorly understood and the exact portal(s) of entry of the 
virus is (are) not determined. Some information may be 
found from H5N1 infections in other mammals whether 
they have become infected naturally or experimentally. 
The question which will receive the main attention 
in the present document is whether ingestion of the 
virus can lead to infection in mammals including 
humans. If this is the case, the next important issue may 
be whether food products derived from infected animals 
or contaminated during handling, may be a source of 
human infection. This issue is important from a food 
safety point of view, but it might also represent a 
professional hazard (e.g. butchers...). Furthermore, this 
point has importance when water, which has been 
contaminated by faecal excretions from infected water 
birds, is being used for consumption, washing or 
swimming. 
The present contribution is aimed to collect infor­
mation on the possibilities and restrictions which may 
influence the occurrence of infection with H5N1 virus 
virus may be a source of infection when passing oropharyngeal 
tissues, which have been identified as target sites for virus 
replication. 
Key words: food, avian influenza, mammals 
via oral ingestion. It mainly considers these features 
from a pathogenetic point of view and includes 
information obtained from H5N1 infected mammals, 
particularly laboratory animals and felines. 
2 AVIAN INFLUENZA VIRUSES (AIV) 
Avian influenza virus infection in birds has a dis­
seminated course and disease ranges from asympto­
matic, to mild respiratory signs, to a rapidly fatal disease. 
In fatal disease outbreaks, highly pathogenic avian 
influenza (HPAI) virus subtypes H7 and H5 are 
involved. As a consequence of the multisystemic pattern 
of infection in avians, virus is widely disseminated in the 
body of infected birds. AI viruses in poultry replicate in 
the intestinal tract and show a definite enterotropism, 
which contrasts with the classical mammalian influenza 
viruses when they cause a natural infection in their host. 
The highly pathogenic AI viruses are thus, in poultry, 
present not only in all tissues, but also in all products 
and excretions of infected birds. Transmission of avian 
influenza viruses between birds occurs via aerosol, but 
also to a large extent, directly and indirectly, through 
faeces and faecally contaminated fomites, water or food 
material. 
2.1. Presence of HPAI viruses in organs of poultry 
Numerous studies have been performed on the 
dissemination of HPAI viruses in avians, which serve as 
important providers of all kinds of food. Tissue tropism, 
virus titres in different organs and degree of viraemia 
vary remarkably between different virus strains and 
among avian species. Most experimental trials have 
been performed in chickens and less information is 
available about turkeys or other domesticated birds. 
HPAI viruses have been demonstrated in the respi­
ratory and gastrointestinal tracts, bone marrow, muscle 
tissue, blood and several internal organs (Mase et al. 
2005, Swayne and Beck 2005, Muramoto et al. 2006). In 
one study, the H5N1 strain replicated in thigh and 
breast muscles to virus titres as high as 1073 E I D 5 0 per 
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gram tissue. In internal organs of chickens inoculated 
with HP H5N1 isolates from Japan, virus titres reached 
up to 1075 E I D 5 0 per gram tissue between 2 and 4 days 
post virus inoculation (Mase et al. 2005). 
Intranasal inoculations of turkeys with a HP H5N1 
virus from the 1997 Hong Kong outbreak revealed the 
presence of infectious virus in the upper respiratory 
tract, lung, heart, brain, pancreas, bone marrow, bursa, 
thymus, spleen, testicles, adrenal glands and feather 
follicles, but virus titres were not determined (Perkins 
and Swayne 2001). 
HP AI virus infections in domesticated and wild 
waterfowl usually remain without clinical signs or lead 
to disease with a markedly less fulminating character. 
Duck meat has been found positive for HP AI viruses 
during routine surveillance of imported poultry. H5N1 
virus, for example, was detected in frozen meat of 
subclinically infected ducks imported from China into 
South Korea (Tumpey et al. 2002) and Japan (Mase et 
al. 2005a). These viruses were later used for inoculation 
trials in ducks, chickens and mice (Tumpey et al. 2003, 
Mase et al. 2005a). The virus strain recovered from 
duck meat in South Korea caused 100% mortality in 
chickens and 22% in mice, while ducks remained 
healthy even though they contained high virus titres in 
the brain, lung, kidney (as high as 1068 E I D 5 0 per gram 
tissue) and muscle (reaching 1055 E I D 5 0 per gram) 
(Tumpey et al. 2002, 2003). The duck meat isolate in 
Japan was highly pathogenic to chickens, replicated 
well in the lungs of mice and spread to the brain, but was 
not as pathogenic in mice as human H5N1 isolates 
(Mase et al. 2005b). 
The H5N1 isolate from duck meat imported into 
Japan replicated in multiple organs in ducks after 
experimental inoculation and induced neurological 
signs in some of the inoculated animals (Kishida et al. 
2005). Virus titres in blood amounted to 1007 to 1023 
EID50 per ml and those in liver and kidney up to 1045 to 
1075 per gram tissue. The above information clearly 
shows that HP AI viruses may end up in all edible 
products of ducks, even though the animals remain 
healthy at slaughter. 
Experimental inoculations of geese with a HP H5N1 
virus from 1997 showed virus replication in brain, lungs 
and kidneys (Perkins and Swayne 2002). At day 4 post 
inoculation, virus titres up to 1067 EID 5 0 per gram brain, 
1028 EID50 per gram lungs and 1036 E I D 5 0 per gram 
kidney were found. 
HP AI viruses are thus widely disseminated in the 
body of domesticated poultry including geese and 
ducks. When infected birds are slaughtered during the 
height of infection, which is 2 to 5 days after contact with 
the virus, virus can be present at high quantities in all 
raw edible tissues and in blood. 
2.2. Presence of HPAIV in eggs 
Virus has been isolated from albumen, yolk samples 
and the shell surface of eggs during the 1983 HP AI 
(H5N2) outbreak in Pennsylvania (Cappucci et al. 
1985), but not during another HP AI (H7N2) outbreak 
in 2001-2002 (Lu et al. 2004). HP AI viruses have also 
been detected in eggs of experimentally infected 
chickens and turkeys (Moses et al. 1948, Narayan et al. 
1969, Beard et al. 1984, Starick and Werner 2003), both 
on the egg surface and in egg contents. Virus detected 
on the egg surface probably was the result of faecal 
contamination during passsage of the egg through the 
cloaca. Virus detected in egg contents presumably 
results from viraemia or virus replication in the oviduct, 
because such eggs were positive particularly when laid 
3 to 4 days post inoculation. However, the acute course 
of the infection in laying chickens leads to a sudden egg 
drop and to rapid mortality so that the risk that infected 
eggs are laid or contain high virus quantities is very low. 
No information is available on the presence of virus 
in eggs from AI virus infected ducks. 
2.3. Presence of AIV in excretions and secretions 
Considering the sites of AI virus replication and the 
generalised character of the infection with HPAI 
viruses, different secretions and excretions carry virus 
sometimes even in high quantities. Chickens inoculated 
with a highly pathogenic H5N2 virus excreted virus from 
the nares, mouth, conjunctiva and cloaca. Virus titres on 
day 3 post inoculation amounted to 1042-1065 EID 5 0 per 
ml of oropharyngeal secrete and to 1045 E I D 5 0 per ml 
faeces (Swayne and Beck 2005). 
Chickens inoculated with a HP H5N1 virus excreted 
virus quantities up to 104 6 E I D 5 0 per ml in the 
oropharynx and 1045 E I D 5 0 per ml faeces within 2 to 3 
day post inoculation (Tian et al. 2005). In another 
experiment titres up to 1075 E I D 5 0 per ml faeces were 
found in H5N1 inoculated chicks killed at 24 hours post 
inoculation (Rimmelzwaan et al. 2006). 
Ducks and geese experimentally or naturally 
infected with H5N1 HPAI viruses have also displayed 
high virus quantities both in oropharyngeal and cloacal 
swabs (Perkins and Swayne 2002, Tian et al. 2005, Ellis 
et al. 2004). 
These data show that faecal material can contain 
very high quantities (titres) of HP AI viruses. Faecal 
material can, therefore, be an important source of avian 
influenza viruses in different avian species. Faeces 
excreted from acutely infected birds may readily 
contaminate all types of food products and water. 
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3. HPAI VIRUSES IN HUMANS 
3.1. Some epidemiological data 
It is generally accepted that the classical human 
influenza virus subtypes (H1N1, H3N2...) do not repli­
cate outside the respiratory tract and that the digestive 
tract does not play a role in the infection or transmission 
processes. Only a few rare, and mainly fatal cases of 
human influenza have revealed low amounts of infec­
tious virus in the blood, internal organs, brain and cere­
brospinal fluids. This is also true for the pathogenesis of 
influenza in other mammalian natural hosts, such as 
the pig. Transmission of these classical human influenza 
viruses among humans thus occurs by inhalation of 
infectious airborn droplets and possibly indirectly 
through contact and self inoculation of upper respira­
tory tract or conjunctival mucosae. 
Transmissions of HPAIV to humans by H5N1 and 
H7N7 viruses have occurred and the exact mode of 
virus entry has, particularly for H5N1, not yet been 
determined. 
Transmission of H7N7 to humans has been reported 
during epizootics with this virus in poultry and 
epidemiological evidence shows that it is the result of 
(self?) inoculation or contact with the conjunctiva. It 
generally leads to a mild conjunctivitis without 
respiratory involvement except for one fatal case of 
pneumonia in the Netherlands (see table 1). 
With H5N1, transmission to humans has occurred 
after close contact with sick or dying poultry and 
generally had taken place within a week before the 
onset of disease. Risks were associated particularly with 
plucking and preparing of diseased poultry, handling 
fighting cocks and playing with infected poultry, 
including asymptomatic ducks. In general, no significant 
risk has to be related with exposure to sick persons or 
eating or preparing poultry products. However, two 
cases in humans were reported after eating raw duck's 
blood, but direct contact with poultry can not be 
excluded in these cases. Therefore, modes of trans­
mission, such as oral ingestion of contaminated food 
and water, have been considered in exceptional cases. 
Swimming in water or rivers contaminated by infected 
duck faeces, leading to direct intranasal inoculation or 
conjunctival exposure or possibly to ingestion of virus, 
have been suggested. Contamination of hands from 
infected fomites followed by self inoculation and even 
the use of poultry faeces as fertilizer have also been 
considered. 
3.2. Clinical signs with H5N1 
H5N1 infection in humans is characterised by severe 
influenza-like syndromes with fever, lethargy, cough, 
shortness of breath and pneumonia. However, besides 
respiratory symptoms, many patients have complained 
about gastro-intestinal signs, such as diarrhoea, vomiting 
and abdominal pain. In some cases, diarrhoea was the 
first sign preceding other clinical manifestations. Morta­
lity rates are up to 89% in humans younger than 15 
years. Death is caused by a progressive respiratory 
failure followed by multi-organ dysfunction. There have 
been a few reported cases of central nervous disorders. 
3.3 Virology and viral replication 
In all cases of human infection with highly 
pathogenic H5N1 AI viruses in Southeastern Asia, the 
repiratory tract was clearly the major site of virus 
replication and of viral pathology (Uiprasertkul et al. 
2005). Most patients died as a result of acute respiratory 
distress syndrome followed by multi-organ failure, but, 
unlike in poultry, there is no firm evidence for a systemic 
infection or for infection of the digestive tract. In one 
fatal H5N1 case in a boy in Thailand, positive-stranded 
viral mRNA was not only detected in the lung, but also 
in the small and large intestines, suggesting productive 
viral production in the gastrointestinal tract (Uiprasert­
kul et al. 2005). No viral RNA was found in plasma, 
adrenal glands, brain, bone marrow, kidneys, liver and 
pancreas. The spleen only contained negative-stranded 
genomic RNA and no positive-stranded messenger 
RNA, showing that there had been no influenza virus 
replication in that organ. On the other hand, exami­
nation of the intestines did neither reveal viral antigen-
positive cells nor histopathological changes and the 
patient did not show diarrhoea. In the lungs, viral 
antigen-positive type II pneumocytes were present and 
characteristic lesions, such as diffuse alveolar damage, 
interstitial pneumonia, focal hemorrhage and 
bronchiolitis, were observed. 
In Vietnam 2 fatal cases of H5N1 infection showed 
severe diarrhoea and encephalitis without respiratory 
disease (de Jong et al. 2005). Only one of the patients 
was virologically examined and the virus was isolated 
from throat and rectal swabs, serum and cerebrospinal 
fluid. Also, several other H5N1 infected cases showed 
diarrhoea in the process of the disease. Viral RNA was 
sometimes detected in intestinal samples by RT-PCR. 
Some of these data thus suggest that the gastro­
intestinal tract may be involved in the H5N1 infection 
in humans. However, intestinal viral antigen-positive 
cells have not been demonstrated until now. While the 
presence of viral nucleic acid in the intestines could be 
an indication of virus replication in the intestines, it 
might also be the result of virus which has been 
swallowed after throat infection. 
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In table 1, a list of human cases caused by AI viruses until January 2007 is presented. 
Table 1. Avian influenza viruses isolated from humans since 1996 
Year 
1996 
1997 
1998-99 
2003 
2003 
2004 
2003^0.7 
J 
V f 
Subtype-
pathotype 
H7N7-LP 
H5N1-HP 
H9N2-LP 
H5N1-HP 
H7N7-HP 
H7N3-HP 
H5N1-HP 
•-
Location 
US 
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong/China 
Hong Kong 
The Netherlands 
Canada 
Vietnam 
Thailand 
Indonesia 
Cambodia 
China 
Turkey 
Iraq 
Azerbaijan 
Egypt 
Djibouti 
Number 
infected 
1 
18 
2 
2 
83 
2 
93 
25 
74 
6 
21 
12 
3 
8 
18 
1 
dead 
0 
6 
0 
1 
1 
0 
42 
17 
57 
6 
14 
4 
2 
5 
10 
0 
Total Number 
infected 
261 
dead 
157 
Symptoms 
Conjuctivitis 
Influenza-like 
Influenza-like 
Influenza-like 
Conjuctivitis 
Conjuctivitis 
Influenza-like 
* Situation on January 1, 2007; HP: highly pathogenic, LP: low pathogenic 
So far, definitive evidence of H5N1 virus replication 
in the intestines of humans is thus still lacking and 
based on the above information, it must be stated that 
the role of the gastrointestinal tract as a possible portal 
of entry or site of replication for H5N1 virus in humans 
is doubtful. If oral uptake of H5N1 virus could be 
responsible for initiating an infection with H5N1 virus, 
it does not necessarily imply that the lower 
gastrointestinal tract allows virus to enter in the body. 
Virus ingested with food could pass, attach to and 
replicate in tissues in the oropharynx and upper 
respiratory tract (nasal mucosa). In all H5N1 infected 
humans, both pharyngeal and nasal swabs yield high 
viral high loads, which shows that not only the 
respiratory tract, but also the oropharynx can be a very 
important target tissue (Beigel et al. 2005, de Jong et al. 
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2005). It is, therefore, possible that initiation of viral 
infection after oral virus uptake is a consequence of 
throat infection rather than of a primary infection of the 
lower gastrointestinal tract. Also, it is not excluded that 
presence of intestinal viral RNA or rectal infectious 
virus is associated with viraemia, considering that 
infectious H5N1 virus or viral RNA have been 
demonstrated in the serum of some patients (Beigel et 
al. 2005, de Jong et al. 2005). 
4. HPAIV IN OTHER MAMMALIAN SPECIES 
4.1 Natural infection routes 
Tigers and leopards: Feeding raw infected chicken 
carcasses from a local slaughterhouse to tigers and 
leopards in Thai zoos led to outbreaks of respiratory 
disease and deaths (Keawcharoen et al. 2004, Thana-
wongnuwech et al. 2005). This occurred at the time 
when many chickens in the area were dying with 
respiratory disease and with neurologic signs due to 
H5N1 virus. These feline species showed a generalised 
course of disease. Clinical symptoms included fever, 
respiratory distress and neurological signs and lesions 
were present in the lungs, heart, thymus, stomach, 
intestines, liver, lymph nodes and brains. Virus 
replication was demonstrated in bronchiolar epithelium, 
hepatocytes and cerebral neurons. These observations 
show that H5N1 virus infection can occur in these feline 
species after oral uptake of H5N1 infected avian 
carcasses. The site of viral entry upon the oral ingestion 
of H5N1 virus in tigers and leopards was not determined 
and no virological examinations of the intestines were 
performed. The authors suggested that the positive 
staining for virus nucleoprotein in hepatocytes may have 
resulted from a heavy virus load that had passed through 
the digestive tract after carcasses were eaten (Thana-
wongnuwech et al. 2005). While the intestines as portal 
of entry was neither proven nor excluded, involvement 
of the liver, may well have been the result of oropha­
ryngeal or respiratory infection followed by gene­
ralisation of the infection rather than initiation in the 
intestinal tract itself. 
Cats: Recently, confirmed natural cases of infection 
with HP H5N1 virus, presumably as a consequence of 
feeding on infected wild birds, have been reported in 3 
cats and in a stone marten in Germany (source: WHO) 
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2006 03 09a/en/index.html. 
A diagnosis of H5N1 infection was made, but no 
other virological studies were performed. 
Dogs: A fatal H5N1 infection also occurred in a dog 
in Thailand in 2004 after the ingestion of carcasses from 
H5N1 infected ducks (Songserm et al. Fatal influenza A 
H5N1 in a dog: Emerging infectious diseases vol. 12 
Nov 2006). The dog showed high fever, panting and 
lethargy approximately 5 days after consuming the 
carcasses and he died the next day. Necropsy findings 
included bloody nasal discharge, severe pulmonary 
congestion and oedema, and congestion of the spleen, 
kidneys and liver. H5N1 virus was isolated from the 
lungs, liver, kidney and urine and immunohisto-
chemistry revealed virus positive cells in the lung alveoli, 
in the liver, in tubular epithelium and in glomeruli of the 
kidneys. 
Samples from the intestinal tract (duodenum, 
jejunum, ileum), as well as brain, trachea, heart, spleen 
and pancreas tested negative in all virologie exami­
nations. Similarly, microscopic lesions were restricted to 
the lungs, liver and kidneys. 
Pigs are also susceptible to avian H5N1 influenza 
virus in nature. Serological evidence of H5N1 infection 
was found in a very small population of pigs (8 of 3.175 
pigs tested, or 0,25%) in Vietnam in 2004, where H5N1 
has hit hardest, and no virological examinations were 
performed (Choi et al. 2005). 
4.2 Experimental infections 
Cats-oral inoculations: Infection of 3 domestic cats 
was experimentally established by oral feeding of chick 
carcasses from chicks that had been inoculated with 
H5N1 virus 24 hours earlier (Rimmelzwaan et al. 2006). 
The liver and lung homogenates of the infected chicks 
used for feeding contained more than IO9 ID50 per 
gram tissue. In all 3 cats, virus replicated not only in the 
respiratory tract, but also in multiple extra respiratory 
tissues including the central nervous system. Viral 
antigen expression and virus-associated ganglioneuritis 
were observed in the submucosal and myenteric plexi in 
duodenum and ileum. Virus was detected consistently 
and at high titres in pharyngeal and nasal swabs, while 
virus titres were highly variable in rectal swabs. This 
study clearly showed that H5N1 infection in felids could 
be established via oral uptake but, again, whether the 
infection was initiated in the oropharyngeal or gastro­
intestinal tissues was not determined. The authors 
suggested that lesions and viral antigens found in the 
neural plexi of Meisner and Auerbach indicated uptake 
of virus via the intestinal lumen. The suggestion was 
made because myenteric plexi were not involved in cats 
that, in a similar experiment, had been inoculated 
intratracheally with the same virus strain. Other possible 
routes of entry were also considered. The neurotropism 
observed with H5N1 virus in cats was striking and neural 
pathways of virus spread and dissemination must not be 
ignored, as further discussed for H5N1 infections in 
mice and ferrets. 
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Cats-intranasal and intratracheal inoculations: 
Intratracheal H5N1 virus inoculations by the use of a 
catheter were performed in 3 cats as part of the 
experiments with orally inoculated cats described above 
(Kuiken et al. 2004, Rimmelzwaan et al. 2006). These 
cats showed clinical signs similar to the cats that had 
been orally fed carcasses of infected chicks. Lesions 
were found in the respiratory tract and extra respiratory 
tissues including the brain, but not in the intestinal 
plexi. Virus was isolated from several internal organs 
tested, which showed that the infection had a 
generalised character. In these cats, infectious virus was 
readily detected in pharyngeal and nasal swabs and also 
in rectal swabs, but the latter were less frequently 
positive and virus was present at much lower titres. This 
experiment also demonstrated that HP H5N1 virus can 
be very pathogenic for cats. Furthermore, horizontal 
transmission occurred to 2 sentinel cats brought in 
contact with the inoculated ones after 48 hours. 
Pig-intranasal inoculations: In three different 
experimental studies, pigs have been inoculated 
intranasally with a high dose (>10 6EID 5 0) of Asian HP 
H5N1 influenza viruses (Choi et al. 2005; Isoda et al. 
Pathogenicity of a highly pathogenic avian influenza 
virus, A/chicken/Yamaguchi/7/04 (H5N1) in different 
species of birds and mammals, Arch. Virol. (2006) 
151:1267-1279; Shortridge et al. Characterization of 
avian H5N1 influenza viruses from poultry in Hong 
Kong, Virology (1998) 252:331-342). Six of the total 8 
H5N1 isolates tested were shown to replicate in pigs. 
Despite the extreme virulence of viruses for poultry, 
the pigs showed only mild or no clinical signs. Virus 
titres in nasal swabs were moderate and there was no 
virus transmission between experimentally inoculated 
and in-contact pigs. In one study, H5N1 virus was 
isolated from the respiratory tract (tonsils, trachea and 
lungs) of all 4 pigs examined and from the liver of 2 of 
4 pigs, but not from the intestines, blood, spleen or 
kidney (Choi et al. 2005). Unfortunately, all these 
studies were performed on a very limited number of 
pigs and detailed studies of the cell and organ tropism 
of H5N1 in pigs are still lacking. 
Ferrets-intranasal inoculations: Ferrets have been 
intranasally inoculated with H5N1 viruses isolated in 
Hong Kong in 1997 (Zitzow et al. 2002) and in other 
Southeast Asian countries in 2003 and 2004 (Govorkova 
et al. 2005, Maines et al. 2005). H5N1 isolates from 
humans induce more severe respiratory disease, fever, 
lethargy and weight loss than common human H3N2 
human influenza viruses. Diarrhoea and neurological 
signs were seen following exposure to the H5N1 isolates 
and many infections were fatal. The H5N1 isolates of 
human origin caused a systemic infection in ferrets, 
with high virus titres in the blood, spleen and liver. Only 
some H5N1 isolates were isolated from the intestine, at 
virus titres that were at least 100 to 1.000 times lower 
than those in the respiratory tract. Inflammatory lesions 
and viral antigen-positive cells, however, were only 
found in the lung alveoli and bronchioli and in neurons 
in the meninges, choroid plexus and brain parenchyma. 
Virus containing cells were not detected in the intestine, 
despite the presence of diarrhoea in some ferrets. While 
the human H5N1 viruses had an obvious neurotropism, 
virus was also isolated from the brains of ferrets 
inoculated with normal human H3N2 influenza viruses, 
which do not spread beyond the respiratory tract in 
humans, and failed to induce neurological signs in 
ferrets. Because influenza virus titres in the olfactory 
bulb of ferrets peaked early in infection, the authors 
suggested that the virus reaches the central nervous 
system via the olfactory nerves and ethmoid plate after 
intranasal inoculation. The H5N1 virus was also isolated 
from the brains of ferrets without detectable viraemia or 
replication in internal organs, so that it is unlikely that 
the virus reaches the nervous system via the circulation. 
Some pathogenetic events in these ferrets inoculated 
with H5N1 resemble those in cats, particularly the 
involvement of extra-respiratory organs and the strong 
neurotropic character. It should be mentioned that 
involvement of the central nervous system has also been 
reported in 2 human cases of H5N1 (de Jong et al. 
2005). 
Mice-intranasal inoculations: Viruses isolated from 
humans in Hong Kong in 1997 showed two distinct 
phenotypes in mice (Gao et al., Lu et al. 1999). Some 
viruses were low pathogenic: they replicated exclusively 
in the respiratory tract, were generally non lethal, and 
animals had cleared the virus by 6 to 9 days post inocu­
lation. Other viruses were highly pathogenic: they 
replicated in multiple organs in addition to the 
respiratory tract and caused mortality in the mouse 
model. Most human isolates from 2003 and 2004, in 
contrast to isolates directly obtained from avians, were 
also highly pathogenic for mice (Maines et al. 2005). 
One of such highly pathogenic viruses was isolated from 
the colon of infected mice, at a low virus titre (102 5PFU 
per gram) (Gao et al. 1999). In another mouse infection 
study with similar H5N1 isolates, the stomach, 
duodenum and large intestine tested negative for 
influenza viral antigen positive cells (Dybing et al. 2000). 
It is clear, at any rate, that the respiratory tract and 
nervous system are the major sites of H5N1 replication 
in mice. According to some studies, viraemia is unlikely 
to contribute to the dissemination of virus to other 
organs in mice, and this is clearly different in chickens 
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(Tanaka et al. 2003, Nishimura et al. 2000). One of the 
Hong Kong/97 H5N1 isolates was found to replicate 
first in epithelial cells of the nasal mucosa, bronchi and 
alveoli, thereafter spread via extensions of the nervus 
vagus and/or nervus trigeminus to the brain stem and 
later to the cerebral cortex (Tanaka et al. 2003). Virus 
spread to the central nervous system may also be virus 
dose-dependent, as a less virulent Hong Kong/97 
(H5N1) isolate was isolated from the brain after 
intranasal inoculation with a high virus dose, but not 
with a low virus dose. 
Macaques-multiple inoculation sites: 
Macaques are considered among the most reliable 
animal models to study the pathogenesis of influenza in 
humans. In experimental infection studies, cynomolgous 
macaques were inoculated with a human Hong Kong/97 
H5N1 isolate via intratracheal and oropharyngeal and 
intraconjunctival inoculation routes (Rimmelzwaan et 
al. 2001, Kuiken et al. 2003). The clinical signs -fever and 
acute respiratory distress- of H5N1 infection in 
macaques resembled those in humans. Unlike in cats, 
mice or ferrets, neurological or gastrointestinal sym­
ptoms did not occur in H5N1-inoculated macaques. 
Another difference with the situation in cats, mice or 
ferrets, was the lack of evidence for replication of H5N1 
outside the respiratory tract. The lungs were clearly the 
major site of H5N1 virus replication. Multiple organ 
dysfunction was observed without evidence of virus 
replication in the brain, spleen, liver or kidney, and was 
probably due to diffuse alveolar damage and acute 
respiratory distress syndrome. To date no investigations 
have been reported as to whether or not H5N1 can 
replicate in the intestines of macaques. 
5. GASTRO-INTESTINAL TRACT AS A POSSIBLE 
ROUTE OF ENTRY FOR AIV IN HUMANS 
For the gastro-intestinal (Gl) tract to serve as a 
possible portal of entry for HP H5N1 virus containing 
food and thus to be considered as a risk factor from a 
food safety point of view, several conditions would need 
to be fulfilled: 
1. Virus must be present in food concerned 
2. Virus must be present in sufficient quantity to be 
able to start an infection (reach the so-called minimal 
infectious dose) 
3. The gastrointestinal tract must have cells that 
allow influenza virus attachment and virus entry in the 
body 
1) Virus must be present 
From the above data, it can definitely be concluded 
that HP H5N1 virus strains are widely disseminated in 
the body not only of infected domesticated avians 
(chickens, turkeys and ducks), but also in subclinically 
infected avian species (ducks and possibly several other 
wild species). All edible products derived from such 
animals at the height of infection can be considered as 
carriers of virus in variable quantities. Considering the 
acute course of the infection in chickens, virus quantities 
will be highest when the samples (blood, meat,...) are 
collected at the end of the incubation period and shortly 
before the animals become sick, which is 2 to 5 days 
after the first contact with the virus. Raw food derived 
from such acutely infected animals (whether sick or 
not) has, therefore, a high chance to contain virus. 
HP AI viruses, in general, are also excreted in poultry 
secretions and excretions in high quantities during these 
acute stages of disease. Excretions, particularly faeces, 
of live animals can thus contaminate water and food 
during slaughter and processing. Eggs may or may not 
contain virus, but quantities are generally low. 
2) Virus quantity reaching the intestine must be 
sufficiently high 
From epidemiological data, it can be assumed that 
entry of HP H5N1 virus and initation of infection in 
mammals is not a regular event and that several factors 
play a role. Intensive contact with infected birds in 
natural infection or high titers to reproduce infection 
are needed. This means that there is no easily accessible 
or highly susceptible primary target site available or 
that very high virus quantities are needed to reach the 
minimal infectious dose. Several physical or chemical 
agents may be of influence to either decrease the virus 
quantity present in contaminated food or to decrease 
the quantity of virus reaching the intestinal tract as 
possible portal of entry. All these may minimise the 
chance that virus uptake in the gastrointestinal tract 
occurs. 
Temperature: Influenza viruses are rather heat 
labile. Even though HP AI viruses are, until now, not 
considered as dangerous from a food safety point of 
view, different agencies involved in the H5N1 epizootics 
and human health issues, such as WHO and EFSA, 
have advised to cook poultry meat and eggs to at least 
70 °C core temperature prior to consumption. This 
temperature completely inactivates all influenza viruses. 
The chance that warmed up food contains sufficient 
residual virus to start infection is very low to non-
existing. However, food products like blood pudding 
that are consumed raw in some countries might contain 
sufficiently high amounts of virus if collected from birds 
during the height of the infection, and may satisfy the 
criterium for minimal infectious dose if virus uptake 
via the gastrointestinal tract could occur. 
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Dilution, removal and inactivation in Gl tract: Even 
if virus containing food is consumed raw, this virus is 
exposed to several steps which may have a virus 
removing or inactivating effect prior to reaching the 
stomach and intestines. After being swallowed, the virus 
will adsorb onto tissues in the upper digestive tract, 
such as oropharynx, oesophagus and the stomach. It 
will be diluted by fluids during the digestive processes. 
Its infectivity may be reduced by the extremely low pH 
of gastric secretions and by the effects of bile, when 
passing the stomach and the duodenum respectively. 
Influenza viruses have a lipid containing envelope and 
inactivating effects of bile have been shown with several 
enveloped viruses. 
Studies on the acid resistance of influenza viruses 
have yielded somewhat contrasting results. In one study 
(Webster et al. 1978), influenza viruses of ducks were 
relatively more acid stable than human viruses and it 
was claimed that this permits them to withstand the 
acid pH of the gizzard and to replicate in the cells lining 
the intestinal tract, which is the major site of replication 
in several avian species. In more recent studies (Lu et 
al. 2003), 4 H7N2 strains were examined for acid 
stability at pH 2 and infectivity was lost in less than 5 
minutes. Still another study (Scholtissek 1985) showed 
great differences in pH sensitivity among different 
subtypes. All H3 strains were relatively stable against 
low pH (5.1-5.4), independent of the species of origin. 
All H7 and H5 strains were relatively labile at pH 5.5-
6.0. HI strains showed an intermediate sensitivity. Low 
pH values appear to affect mainly the HA and NA. 
Acid stability of AI viruses appears to be a 
multifactorial issue in which not only the virus strain, 
but also the virus quantity, the embedding medium, the 
pH value and the duration of exposure will play a role. 
Whether influenza viruses will be inactivated by 
exposure to the low pH of the gastric secretions is thus 
unpredictable and complete virus inactivation after 
passage through the stomach cannot be guaranteed. 
Acid lability of influenza viruses and virus inactivation 
by the low pH in the stomach has long been presumed 
to be one of the main reasons why influenza viruses in 
mammals do not reach the intestines in an infectious 
state or in sufficient quantity. However, it must be stated 
that replication of any influenza virus in intestinal 
tissues in mammals has never been demonstrated. 
3) Virus entry and replication in the lower digestive tract 
So far, there is insufficient evidence in humans to 
state that H5N1 virus, if it ends up in the intestinal 
lumen upon oral uptake or consumption of infected 
food, could initiate infection via the intestinal tract or 
could actually replicate in intestinal tissues of humans. 
The susceptibility of mammalian intestinal cells to 
H5N1 or other influenza viruses has been barely 
examined. In an older pathogenesis study in intranasally 
inoculated ferrets, 6 of 14 influenza viruses examined 
(including 2 LP AI viruses), were only isolated from one 
or another part of the intestinal tract (Kawaoka et al. 
1987). In the same study carried out in intranasally 
inoculated pigs, one of 4 influenza viruses tested was 
also isolated from the faeces whereas the virus could not 
be demonstrated in the jejunum, ileum or colon. 
A first possible barrier to H5N1 infection of human 
enteric cells may be a lack of suitable receptors on those 
cells so that the viral HA cannot attach. Receptor 
studies in mammals, however, have focused exclusively 
on the respiratory tract and there is no information on 
the types of receptors in the human intestinal tract. 
Obviously, receptor specificity of the viral HA is not the 
only factor responsible for susceptibility. Indeed, it is 
generally accepted that the host and host cell specificity 
of influenza viruses is controlled by a variety of viral 
genes and their interactions and role in different cellular 
environments (Zambon 2001). Even if an influenza 
virus succeeds to enter a host cell, it must successfully 
co-opt with host cell proteases to replicate there. The 
viral polymerases, which are responsible for the 
replication and transcription of viral RNA, play a key 
role during this stage. During the release of newly 
produced virus particles from infected cells, the viral 
HA tends to re-bind to receptors on the cell surface 
and the neuraminidase (NA) helps to break this binding. 
Like the HA, the NA has also a preference for one of 
both types of sialic acid receptors and it may also 
influence the host and cell tropism of influenza viruses. 
Oral uptake of H5N1 has led to infection in cats 
and tigers, but it should be stressed that either the 
oropharynx or the upper respiratory tract tissues or the 
intestinal tract or more than one tissue might serve as 
the portal of entry of the virus. In the orally inoculated 
cat experiment, it was suggested that the virus may use, 
as entry site, nerve endings of the intestinal plexi in the 
intestinal lumen. It is, however, also possible that spread 
of influenza virus via neural pathways has occurred and 
that the plexi were reached via the nervous system and 
not via the intestinal lumen. Cats showed indeed virus 
replication in the central nervous tissues indicating 
neural tropism. Such neural tropism of H5N1 virus has 
been shown in several experimentally inoculated 
mammals including ferrets and mice and was also 
confirmed in one human case in Vietnam. The 
possibility exists that, through this neurotropic 
characteristics, virus entry and spread in the body occurs 
via nerves starting from the upper respiratory tract or 
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tonsils. Neural spread of H5N1 was shown in mice 
(Tanaka et al. 2003). 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
It is unlikely that the lower GI tract (stomach and 
intestines) could serve as a portal of entry for H5N1 
virus in humans after consumption of food products 
derived from infected animals. There is no evidence 
that the virus replicates in the human intestine or that 
gastrointestinal symptoms observed in some patients 
are due to direct effects of the virus in that organ. Even 
if virus uptake in the GI tract would be possible, e.g. via 
nerve endings as was suggested for the orally inoculated 
cats, the chances that these endings would be hit are 
very slim considering the many barriers which the virus 
has to overcome to reach the intestinal lumen in a 
presumably minimal infectious dose. Diarrhoea, which 
was seen in some of the human H5N1 cases, may thus 
very well be an aspecific symptom. Similarly, the 
presence of viral RNA or even the single isolation of 
infectious virus from rectal swabs in a few human cases 
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